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rOMMANDERY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. 



WAR PAPER 42. 



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COfflMAMDEI^Y OF THE DI^TI^ICiT OF [SOLUIV[BIi\. 



WAR PAPERS. 

42 

^Ke Battles sf "IFraatclia and IKasKvilU. 

, PREPARED BY COMPANION 

Major 

HENRY M/ KENDALL, 

U S. A., 

AND 

READ AT THE STATED MEETING OF MAY 7, 1902. 



IV' 



(Sikt §%UU^ ot ^xmUin mA §ta0hirilk 



Despite its brilliant strategy and the undoubted value 
of its territorial gains, Sherman's Atlanta Campaign was, as 
regards its greatest object, a partial failure. What that ob- 
ject was is plainly indicated in Grant's instructions of April 
4, 1864: "To move against Johnston's army, to break it up^ 
and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as 
you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war 
resources." Sherman had penetrated somewhat into the 
enemy's country and had inflicted material damage against 
their war resources, but he had by no means broken up the 
Confederate army. The campaign had in fact been one of 
manoeuvre rather than of battle, and at its termination the 
opposing rebel force was, as a result of recruiting and rein- 
forcement, almost if not quite as strong as it had been at the 
outset of the campaign. It was intact and formidable, well sup- 
plied and equipped, and not shaken in morals. Relative to 
the campaign, Sherman has spoken of the Fabian policy of 
Johnston, and, in consequence, his relief from command by 
Hood, and has said: "But I had not accomplished all, for 
Hood's army, the chief objective had escaped " (pages 252-3-4 
Vol. 4, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War). 

In fact, after the fall of Atlanta, Sherman found himself less 
favorably situated for the destruction of Hood's army than 
he was when the campaign began. As he says in his memoirs 
the true objective of his forces was "the army of Joe Johnston, 
go where it might." But he could no longer engage in serious 
pursuit, owing to the great extension of his supply line, its ex- 



posure to attack, and the attendant necessit}' of exhausting 
detachments to guard it. Sherman had experienced serious 
difficulties in maintaining the supply of his army as far as 
Atlanta, and had found it necessary to use one-third of his 
entire strength to keep his communication open. He real- 
ized that he could go no further while retaining Nashville and 
Chattanooga as his bases. Wheeler's cavalry was energeti- 
cally raiding his railroad line between Atlanta and Chatta- 
nooga, while Forrest was creating constant terror in Tennessee. 
Two divisions were sent back to attempt to destroy Forrest, 
and Thomas was directed to endeavor to carry out this diffi- 
cult duty, and relieve the strain on the communications be- 
tween Chattanooga and Nashville. 

Sherman had to devise some practicable scheme for the 
effective use of his large army which was lying inert near 
Atlanta. He would have liked nothing so much as to induce 
Hood to attack and become seriously engaged, or to so place 
himself that he could be attacked in force. But Hood was 
too wary to permit himself to be drawn into a battle, know- 
ing as he did that all the advantages would be with Sherman. 
Not all of Sherman's plans were favorably considered by 
Grant, who insisted that Sherman should first "entirely ruin 
Hood." Plan after plan did Sherman offer, but no one of them 
had as its principal object the destruction of the army he had 
been opposing since the spring. 

Hood embraced the initiative, moving his whole force to 
the west and north, striking the railroad in several places, 
interrupting the communication for some time, and at last, 
toward the end of October, drawing off his army to Gadsden, 
Alabama, without having been seriously engaged. This 
movement had forced Sherman to concentrate the greater 
part of his army at Gaylesville, Alabama, where he remained 



waiting for Hood's next move. He was now convinced that 
Atlanta was not permanently tenable while Hood's force re- 
mained intact. It was plainly Hood's intention to so operate 
against Sherman's communications as to compel him to fall 
back behind the line of the Tennessee river, giving up all the 
country which he had gained in his recent campaign. In 
short, Hood wished to do just what Sherman had just done so 
successfully — to gain ground by strategic movements rather 
than by battles. 

Beauregard had just been placed in territorial command 
over Hood with instructions not to assume active command 
over Hood's army. He consulted with Hood at Gadsden 
and a plan was agreed upon. Forrest was to be withdrawn 
from West Tennessee and to join Hood, who was then to move 
into Tennessee, crossing the river at Guntersville, destroy 
Sherman's coramunications at Stevenson and Bridgeport, and 
turn against any opposing force in Tennessee. Meanwhile 
Wheeler's cavalry was to harrass Sherman's army and cover 
the movement. 

Sherman had now fixed his mind on a march to the sea, 
and determined to leave to Thomas the duty of opposing 
Hood. To enable Thomas to carry out this duty he proposed 
to "send back to Tennessee the Fourth Corps, all dismounted 
cavalry, all sick and wounded, and all incumbrances whatever 
except what he could haul in his wagons." With this single 
corps, and the scattered detachments in Tennessee, he wanted 
Thomas to defend the line of the Tennessee in his absence, for 
three months, against Hood's force which he decidedly under- 
estimated at forty thousand men. And he deliberately pro- 
posed to take all the remaining sound portions of his army 
and march away from Hood to the sea, unopposed by any 
considerable force. It is true that he seemed to think that 



the chances were Hood would follow him, but he recognized 
that, on the other hand. Hood might seize the opportunity to 
invade Tennessee, and, like Bragg, try to carry the war as far 
as or beyond the Ohio. There can be no doubt that were 
Hood to succeed in such a campaign, a serious mistake 
would have been made by Sherman in removing his main body 
from its natural theatre. In view of this danger it might have 
been reasonably expected that a proper force would have been 
left to Thomas. 

On the 2 2d of October, Hood left Gadsden with twenty 
days' rations, and marched towards Guntersville. On the way 
he changed his entire plan without consulting Beauregard. 

He says he found that Forrest would not be able to join him 
as planned, as he had become engaged in a raid down the left 
bank of the Tennessee, and further that he was concerned 
about his supplies. On the 26th of October the rebel army 
appeared in front of Decatur, a point about 75 miles west of 
Gadsden on the Tennessee river, and made an unsuccessful 
demonstration with a view of securing a crossing at that point. 
He then moved further west to Florence and Tuscumbia, 
placing one division north of the river at the former point. 

Sherman now directed Stanley with the Fourth Corps to 
leave Gaylesville and report to Thomas. The corps was 
directed to take up a position near Pulaski, Tennessee, which 
it did by the 5th of November. In a few days Sherman 
ordered Schofield with his corps, the Twenty-third, reduced 
to about 10,000 men, to report also to Thomas. On the 14th 
of November Schofield took command at Pulaski, although 
junior to Stanley, by reason of being a department commander. 
His entire force near Pulaski comprised about 18,000 infantry 
and artillery and about 5,000 cavalry. 
'' Hood's force consisted of three corps, under Cheatham, 



Stewart, and S. D. Lee, and Forrest's cavalry. Its approxi- 
mate strength was 41,185 infantry and artillery and 12,750 
cavalr3% a total of about 54,000 men. It was especially strong 
in artillery in order to overcome any serious opposition by 
the Federal gunboats. 

Thomas' force, at this time, comprised the Fourth and 
Twenty-third Corps and about 5,600 cavalry in the field. He 
had also in garrisons in the District of Tennessee about 18, 000, 
and might use the 6,000 troops under Steedman in the District 
of the Etowah. There were also a number of unassigned de- 
tachments, pertaining generally to the organizations in Sher- 
man's army for the march to the sea, amounting at the end 
of October to about 7,300 men. As soon as Sherman let go 
of Atlanta there would be no further use for holding on to any 
points along the railroad except Chattanooga, where there 
were large amounts of supplies. Sherman advised Thomas 
to unite all his men into one army and abandon all minor 
points.- What Thomas needed was time to concentrate his 
widely separated forces and weld them into an effective army.' 
It would seem^ that Sherman should have held on to Atlanta 
until Thomas had been permitted to make some real progress 
in forming his army, but the criticism of his moving off and 
leaving Thomas unready is offset by the fact that Thomas 
himself states, in a despatch of November 12th, the day Sher- 
man started, that he had "no fear that Beauregard can do us 
any harm now, and if he follows you (Sherman) I will follow 
him as far as possible. If he does not follow you I will then 
thoroughly organize my troops and I believe I shall have near 
enough to ruin him unless he gets out of the way very rapidly." 
It is true he, Thomas, was expecting that the Sixteenth Corps, 
under A. J. Smith, would soon arrive from. Missouri, whence 
it had been ordered about the end of October. 



8 



Thomas did not draw in his outlying garrisons at once, but 
directed Granger to unite the garrisons of Decatur, Athens and 
neighboring points, and demonstrate toward Courtland with 
a view to hold as much of the opposing force away from 
Florence as possible, and thereby prevent a general advance. 
But if attacked in force. Granger was to fall back, not towards 
Pulaski, as concentration would require, but in the direction 
of Stevenson. 

Hood was very slow in beginning his forward movement 
owing to lack of supplies and somewhat, no doubt, to inde- 
cision as to his proper course. His army left Florence on the 
19th of November moving on Lawrenceburg, which was about 
16 miles west of Pulaski. Forrest with 6,000 cavalry led 
the advance and was opposed by the cavalry of Croxton and 
Hatch. From Lawrenceburg a good road led direct to Col- 
umbia, where the railroad and turnpike to Pulaski cross the 
Duck river. On the 2 2d Hood's main body was at Lawrence- 
burg, on Schofield's right fiank, and about the same distance 
from Columbia. Schofield's position was perilous owing to 
the danger of being cut off. He had been warned of Hood's 
advance by Hatch, and the orders of General Thomas, on the 
20th, directed him to prepare to fall back to Columbia. Two 
divisions were ordered to Lynville, half way back to Columbia, 
on the 2 2d, to be followed on the next day by the rest of the 
force with the wagon trains. Schofield barely escaped being 
anticipated at Columbia. His leading division reached that 
point — just in time to interpose a line between Forrest and the 
retreating Union cavalry — on the .morning of the 24th. 
Nothing but the severe weather prevented Hood from seizing 
Columbia with a sufficient force to hold it. As it was, his march 
was seriously delayed by the condition of the roads, and 
Schofield was allowed time to escape the consequences of 
holding on at Pulaski too long. 



Fortunately, however, Schofield was [able - to assemble 
his force at Columbia on the 24th, and was joined by Ruger 
with one brigade from Johnsonville. The ground north of the 
river was unsuitable for defense, being commanded by the 
south bank. Schofield took up a semi-circular line around 
Columbia on the south bank, and placed Wilson, who had 
arrived to command the cavalry, on his left, to cover the 
country in the direction of Lewisburg and Shelby ville, watch- 
ing all the fords. Hood was not able to bring up all his troops 
until the 26th owing to the state of the roads. 

Meanwhile Thomas had been constantly looking forward to 
the arrival of Smith's Corps, hoping to be able to concentrate 
at Columbia or Franklin. But there had been great delay 
in the movement of Smith's troops, so that instead of leaving 
St. Louis on the loth, as promised by Rawlins, who had been 
sent by Grant to direct their embarkation, they did not begin 
to reach St. Louis until the 24th. This delay ended Thomas' 
plan of concentration in advance of Nashville, although it 
would seem that he might have availed himself of the garrisons 
of Murfreesboro and other points in Tennessee and of Granger's 
force, useless after Hood's advance. 

Schofield found that the line of works at first constructed 
at Columbia was too long to hold, if seriously attacked, and an 
interior line of suitable length was constructed. Soon, however , 
he was convinced that Hood would not attack him in a well 
entrenched position, but would seek to turn him, probably 
by his right. In the night of the 27th he withdrew to the 
north bank, partly destroying the railroad bridge and com- 
pletely destroying the pontoon bridge, for which he had no 
transportation. Forrest succeeded in placing one brigade 
north of the river during the forenoon of the 28th, and drove 
back the Union cavalry on the roads to Spring Hill and 



lO 



Franklin. Wilson endeavored to ^concentrate to oppose him. 
but did not succeed until about 7 P. M'., and then only at 
Hurt's Crossroads, at a considerable distance from the river. 
He learned that Hood's force was crossing to Schofield's left, 
and at i P. M., November 29th, sent word to Schofield that 
Hood would reach Spring Hill, about 11 miles in his rear on 
the road to Franklin, by noon, and advising Schofield that his 
infantry should reach that point by 10 A. M. This message 
reached Schofield at daylight. Instead of acting upon it he 
sent Stanley with two divisions only to Spring Hill. A 
brigade of infantry was sent to reconnoiter up the river and 
soon confirmed Wilson's report of Hood's movement. 

Soon after daylight a heavy artillery fire was begun by the 
Confederates from the south bank of the river, which here 
makes a sharp horseshoe bend. The intensity of this fire 
led Schofield to think a large part of Hood's force was still at 
Columbia, caused him to modify his order to Stanley so that 
one division was left at the crossing of Rutherford's Creek, fac- 
ing east. He seems to have thought that Hood would really 
move down the north bank and make both a front and flank 
attack. The truth was that Hood had left most of his ar- 
tillery and two divisions of Infantry under S. D. Lee at Colum- 
bia, and with the remainder of his force passed around Scho- 
field's left flank aiming to cut him off from Franklin at Spring 
Hill, if possible. 

Schofield now had his army very much extended on the 
road from Columbia to Spring Hill, a distance of 1 1 or 12 miles. 
He was not well situated to oppose if he did attack as he ex- 
pected, and every hour increased his danger of being cut off. 
Moreover, Thomas telegraphed him at 3.30 P. M.: "I desire 
you to fall back from Columbia and to take up your position at 
Franklin, leaving a sufficient force at Spring Hill to contest the 
enemy's progress until you are securely posted at Franklin." 



II 



It would seem that the narrow escape at Columbia should 
have induced Schofield to retire quickly to a position from 
which he could directly oppose Hood, and secure such advan- 
tages of position as to make up for his inferior strength. It 
did not, however, for some time passed prior to a movement. 
Stanley's arrival at Spring Hill was not opportune. He 
reached there about noon and found Forrests' cavalry enter- 
ing the town. The rebels were driven back, and Stanley took 
up a long semi-circular line extending from the railroad on the 
north, around by the east and south. In this position he suc- 
cessfully resisted repeated assaults from Hood's advance 
division, fighting until well after dark. 

The situation was now extremely critical. The nearest 
support for Stanley was the division he had left in obedience 
to Schofield's latest order, about seven miles to the south. 
The other divisions were distributed along the road as far south 
as Columbia, while the cavalry, which had been stoutly oppos- 
ing Forrest's advance, had been pushed back to the vicinity of 
Mount Carmel, about five miles to the east. Hood's turning col- 
umn had arrived in the immediate vicinity of Spring Hill, and 
might easily have destroyed Stanley's force, or have taken up a 
position across the road north of the town, and entirely cut 
off Schofield's retreat. Hood claims that he ordered such a 
movement, but it is denied by some of his division and corps 
commanders, who say that he caused Stewart's corps to take 
up a position south of Rutherfords Creek facing the turn- 
pike, and did not move it toward Spring Hill until it was too 
late to take up the desired position. However it may be, it 
is certain that Hood lost here one of the finest opportunities 
ever offered to a general in war. Instead of taking position 
across the road, his line was long and somewhat oblique to it, 
distant from one-half a mile to a mile. When night fell only 



12 



Stanley's single division was at Spring Hill. Schofield, who 
had remained at Duck River all day, reached Spring Hill with 
Ruger's division at 7 P. M., from which point he pushed on to 
Thompson's Station. He had ordered Cox to hold on with his 
division at Columbia until nightfall, and then to fallback to 
Spring Hill, to be followed successively by the other divisions 
along the road, thereby shortening his whole line from the 
right, avoiding confusion, and maintaining a line ready for 
any contingency. This movement was a very good one. Cox 
had been opposed by Lee and his artillery all day, but had 
successfully resisted his attempts to cross the stream. His 
tired troops now had to march to Spring Hill, and when they 
reached that point, at midnight, had still to push on to Frank- 
din, twelve miles further. The column succeeded in moving 
by the rebel camps during the night, and the last of the army 
left Spring Hill only a little before daybreak. Stanley's 
splendid fighting had repelled the rebel attempt to seize 
Spring Hill, but Hood, had he so moved, might not have been 
prevented from placing his force across the road to the north. 
The army reached the vicinit}^ of Franklin without, serious 
interruption. A few dashes were made at the wagon train 
by Forrest's cavalry, but only a few wagons were lost. Scho- 
field was much worried about the means of crossing the Har- 
peth at Franklin, as he had destroyed his pontoons at Colum- 
bia. Franklin is on the south bank of the Big Harpeth river, 
which here makes a sharp bend to the north and then west; 
to the south of the town and about 1,000 yards from its out- 
skirts is a line of low hills springing from the beginning of the 
bend and running in a semi-circular direction around the town 
to the river again. This furnished an excellent line of de- 
fense, secure on both flanks and, being only about two miles in 
length, quite suited to occupation by a force like Schofield's. 



13 

The north bank is much higher than the southern, furnishing 
favorable positions for covering and flanking artillery fire. 
■ The great disadvantage consists in having the stream directly 
in rear, especially as at this time the county bridge was de- 
stroyed and the stream was liable to freshets which would ren- 
der it unfordable. The railway enters the town from the south, 
parallel to the Columbia pike, and less than half a mile from 
it, crossing the defensive line at its extreme left then parallel- 
ing the river to its next bend where it crosses on a covered 
bridge. About half a mile to the right of the Columbia pike 
the line is crossed by the Carter's Creek road coming in from 
the southwest and joining the turnpike about i,ooo yards in 
rear. The line from the river and railroad to the Carter's Creek 
road formed the real front; its key was the hill at Carter's 
House on the Columbia river. At this point there was a 
locust thicket furnishing material for a light abattis ; an osage 
orange hedge served as an obstruction in front of the left. 

As fast as the troops arrived they threw up a line of earth- 
works which soon formed a complete bridge head. In front 
of the works the ground is quite open, sloping gently down 
to a broad rolling valley terminated about two miles to the 
south by a range of high hills. 

General Cox was placed in immediate command of the line, 
and Schofield, together with Stanley, crossed the river to the 
north bank where there was a heavy work called Fort Granger. 
Schofield had placed two brigades of Wagner's division of 
Schofield's Corps in position across the pike about half a mile 
in front of the main line, with orders to withdraw if Hood 
showed a disposition to advance in force. One brigade — 
Opdycke's — was in reserve at Carter's Hill, behind the main 
line. The other two divisions of the corps occupied the 
line from the river to the Carter's Creek road. Kimball's Divi- 



14 

sionof Stanley'sCorpsextendedtlieline westto the river, and 
Wood's Division was placed north of the stream. All the 
dispositions were excellent except the advanced position of 
Wagner's two brigades, which seemingly were with the 
desire to force a more distant deployment. The line was 
ready by three o'clock in the afternoon, and Schofield ordered 
a general withdrawal to the north bank to begin at six o'clock 
if Hood did not attack, as he thought probable. In this 
opinion Stanley concurred, convinced that as Hood had not 
thought it desirable to attack the similar line at Columbia, 
much less would he do so against this stronger position with 
only part of his force. 

But Hood was chagrined at the failure to improve the 
opportunity at Spring Hill, and ordered an immediate attack. 
At 3 o'clock in the afternoon word was received from Wagner's 
advance brigades that the enemy was deploying strong lines 
at the foot of the hills to the south. At the same time For- 
rest's Cavalry was endeavoring to force the crossings of the 
river above the town. Fortunately his force was not united, 
but distributed on both flanks and Wilson's cavalry was able 
by continued dismounted action to drive the rebels back and 
hold them to the south bank. 

Hood formed Stewart's Corps to the right of the road, and 
Cheatham's to the left. The divisions were formed for attack 
in two and three lines. Lee's division, only part of which 
had yet arrived, was held in reserve. The artillery had not 
yet come up from Columbia, so Hood was deprived of its use. 
He states that he ordered that the artillery be not used be- 
cause of the presence of women and children in the town, but 
the reports plainly show that at least two batteries which had 
accompanied the turning column were used. It seems plain 
then that Schofield's holding on at Columbia deprived Hood 
of his large artillery strength when most needed. 



15 

About 4 o'clock Hood's whole line anvanced. Wagner's 
brigades did not fall back as distinctly ordered both by Scho- 
field and Cox, but by Wagner's express order stood to fight. 
The first shock of the attack fell on them and in a few moments 
being overlapped on both flanks and of greatly inferior 
strength, they were thrown back in utter disorder on the 
center of the main line, immediately followed by the enemy. 
The disorderly mass swarmed over the parapets carrying the 
line with them and opening a gap nearly two hundred yards 
in length at the very key of the Union position. Fortunately 
Opdycke's Brigade and the other reserves in the immediate 
vicinity, rushed promptly into the breach and succeeded in 
repelling the rebel advance, recovering the line throughout all 
but a very small portion of its length. • The construction of 
the line had been most excellent, there being two salients 
close to the pike from which the enemy could be effectively 
taken in flank. The remainder of the line had successfully 
withstood the attack, the concentric nature and speed of 
which had resulted in great intermingling and disorder in 
Both Cheatham's and Stewart's Corps. To add to this a 
number of general officers had been killed or wounded during 
the first attack. The successive rebel lines attacked, and 
being repulsed, were partially reformed and returned to the 
attack again, and again, until after dark. The reserve division 
of Lee's Corps was pushed into the fight at dark, but was 
repulsed. The remaining two divisions did not arrive until 
it was too late to become engaged. 

During the night Schofield withdrew his whole force and 
retired to within the lines at Nashville. The Union losses in 
the battle were 189, killed, 1,033 wounded, and 1,104 rnissing, 
a total of 2,326. The rebel losses are not definitely known — 
their reports being made up about ten days later to include 



i6 



the entire campaign up to that time. At that time the total 
loss is placed at 7,547 of which about 6,300 seem to be acknow- 
ledged as occurring at Franklin. 

The outcome of the battle certainly shows that Hood erred 
in attacking as he did after time had been allowed the Union 
force to entrench. 

Hood's narrative and report offer as reasons for this attack 
that he had learned from captured despatches that it was 
Thomas' desire to hold Franklin, and that Schofield had been 
instructed to make his position strong. It was too close to 
Nashville to permit another turning movement, and he thought 
his best chance was to make a prompt attack before Schofield 
had been given time to greatly strengthen his position. Joe 
Johnston criticises the attack as "the useless butchery at 
Franklin." Beauregard refers to the "great loss and waste of 
life." This much is plain — that it resulted in such serious loss 
to Hood as to unfit his army for further opposition to Thomas' 
main force, and in no material advantage whatever. 

Up to this period the active portion of the campaign con- 
sisted entirely in the use of Schofield's 24,000 men as a con- 
taining or delaying force against Hood's army of about 54,000. 
Lieutenant-General Schofield, in his " Forth-six Years in the 
Army," pages 165 to 188, has made a reliable, valuable, and 
interesting statement as to the operations of the campaign; 
and has added, pages 189 to 225, a sketch deemed necessar}^ 
to a full understanding of the operations preceding and imme- 
diately following the battle of Franklin. 

In the meantime Smith's corps had begun to arrive on 
November 30th, and Thomas had been busily at work or- 
ganizing a forward movement from Nashville. On December 
I Schofield's force arrived from Franklin and Steedman with 
about 5,200 men from Chattanooga. Most of Granger's force 



17 

and Milroy's from TuUahoma were drawn in to Murfreesboro, 
thus giving at that place about 9,000 men under General Rous- 
seau. Hood began to take up a position in front of Nashville 
on the 3d of December, and detached Bates' division of 
Cheatham's Corps to destroy the railroad between Nashville 
and Murfreesboro. Forrest was also directed to co-operate 
with Bates. After a few skirmishes, resulting in the breaking 
up of communication between Murfreesboro and Nashville, 
Forrest united with Bates on the 5th, and on the 6th appeared 
in front of the town receiving there a reinforcement of two brig- 
ades of infantry. The ensuing skirmishes resulted in about 
equal losses, and Forrest never made a decided attempt to 
attack the defenses, preferring the more sensible method of 
trying to entice the garrison out of the works. Bate's Division 
was recalled to the front of Nashville, and Forrest with the 
greater part of his cavalry and three brigades of infantry 
remained to the east of Nashville, out of touch with the rest 
of Hood's forces. 

Hood's line was to the south and east of Nashville, approach- 
ing the Union works to within abou,t 600 yards near the left, 
then -was drawn back along a stone wall at the side of the 
turnpike to Hillsboro. Lee's corps was placed in the center 
across the Franklin pike ; Cheatham's on the right and Stewart's 
on the left. The cavalry was placed in the gap between the 
left and the river. The force was too much extended and 
without a general reserve. A number of detached works 
were constructed to support the left flank. In front of the 
main line was a light advanced line extending through the 
greater part of the front. The Union works consisted of an 
outer line extending from the river above the town, southwest 
to within a short distance of the Hillsboro pike. Thence it 
ran northwesterly, sweeping around in an easy curve to the 



river below the town. An inner line ran trom about the 
center of the east face of the main line in a generally north- 
easterly direction to the river. Hood's left was nearly oppo- 
site the salient of the main line. 

' Wilson's Cavalry was placed at Edgefield on the north 
bank of the river. Steedman's force was at the extreme left, 
then Schofield's Corps, then the Fourth Corps (now com- 
manded by Wood), and finally Smith's Corps on the right. 
The inner line was manned by the Quartermaster's employees 
and a division of convalescents and men returning from fur- 
lough. 

As soon as Hood arrived in front of Nashville pressure 
began to be brought on Thomas from Grant, the President 
and Secretary of War, urging him to leave his defenses and 
attack Hood. Thomas wanted a few more days to mount 
his cavalry and delayed attacking. On the 8th of December, 
when he was about ready, there began a freezing storm which 
alternated rain and frost for several days, covering the ground 
with a sheet of ice and making movement entirely impractica- 
ble. The pressure continued on Thomas and went so far that 
anorder was issued for him to turn the command over to Scho- 
field. A council of corps commanders was held and was 
unanimously of opinion that it was not pracicable to move. 
On the 13th Logan was ordered to Nashville to relieve Thomas, 
but before he reached there the battle had been fought. 

Thomas' original plan was to demonstrate against Hood's 
right with Schofield's Corps and, swinging around his own 
right, roll up Hood's left, cutting him off from Franklin and 
driving him to the seat or capturing him. It soon appeared 
that Hood was extending his line to the right or perhaps mov- 
ing under cover to his right as though to get into close touch 
with Forrest. This caused Thomas to weaken his left and 



^9 

employ Schofield's Corps to give weight to the main attack. 
This plan being agreed upon was to be carried out as soon as 
the condition of the ground permitted. On the 14th there 
came a warm rain and thaw and the attack was ordered for the 
next day. 

The morning of the 15th was very foggy, thus hiding the 
movement of Thomas' army, but also retarding them. The 
ground was very muddy, and the time required for the move- 
ment of Smith's Corps was much greater than had been ex- 
pected. Steedman was to make a strong demonstration on 
the left with his two brigades. Wood's and Smith's Corps 
from a line in prolongation of the east face of the works, were 
to deliver the main attack on Hood's center and left. Scho- 
field's Corps was to be held in reserve in rear of Wood's Corps 
and designed to strengthen the right or resist counter attack 
were Hood to repeat the tactics of Stone river. Wilson's - 
cavalry was to clear the roads and move on Smith's right. 
The interior line of works was to be held by the garrison. 

Steedman's demonstration began about six o'clock in the 
morning and became rather more of an attack than was in- 
tended. The delay of Smith's march resulted in holding 
Wilson within the lines until about 10 o'clock, there being 
no road open for him. Wilson advanced with three columns 
and a reserve, sweeping the country in front of and beyond the 
right. The swinging movement of Smith's and Wood's Corps 
was steadily made, driving in the rebel advance line. The 
dismounted cavalry and right of Smith's Corps captured the 
detached works on Hood's left. Schofield's Corps now ex- 
tended the right, and the attack was directed against the 
left of Hood's line, driving it back just as darknesss was fall- 
ing. Wood's advance had also been greatly delayed, but 
kept pace with Smith's progress, its right being thrown against 



20 



the salient of Hood's line. Steedman kept up the attack 
on the left all during the day. 

Hood finding the main attack falling on his left, withdrew 
Cheatham's Corps except one division from his right, and ex- 
tended and entrenched his left. After the left was broken 
Hood withdrew his whole force to a shorter line about two 
miles in rear of what had been his center and left. This line 
faced north squarely across the two direct roads to Franklin, 
its flanks resting on high hills within about half a mile of the 
turnpikes. Both flanks were thrown back and intrenched, 
especially the left. 

The Union losses during the first day were surprisingly 
small considering the results attained, being not more than 
1 ,000 in killed, wounded and missing. About nightfall Thomas 
judged that Hood was going to make a hasty retreat and 
ordered Wood's corps to move by its left to the Franklin pike 
and then to push southward. Darkness stopped the move- 
ment, which resulted in a throwing back of Wood's left. No 
new orders were issued during the night for the next day's 
attack if Hood was found to have taken up a new position. 
The gaps in the line were filled, especially one between the 
two divisions on Schofield's first line. 

The advance began at six o'clock in the morning. Steed- 
man attacked the rebel right, driving back the advance line 
of skirmishers, and closing towards Wood's left. Wood was 
compelled to place all three divisions in line owing to the gap 
which his flank movement the night before had opened be- 
tween him and Smith. The Union line was now parallel to 
Hood's and overlapped it only on the Union right. When 
Steedman's line united with Wood's the general command of 
the left was given to Wood. 

A strong cross fire of artillery was kept up all morning on 



21 

Hood's left. The swinging movement of Wilson's dismounted . 
cavalry continued, followed by that of Schofield's right. The 
construction of the works on the hill at Hood's left had been 
somewhat defective, and permitted the line to be struck in 
reverse. This soon so shattered the defenses as to permit of 
an assault, and about four o'clock an attack all along the line 
of Smith's and Schofield's corps was made, while Wilson's 
dismounted cavalry pressed the rear of the rebel left. Pressed 
on all sides the rebel left and center gave way in utter dis- 
order. Meanwhile Steedman and Wood had made a strong 
attack, preceded by heavy artillery fire, on Hood's extreme 
right, which, although repulsed, caused Hood to somewhat 
weaken his left. Hood made no counter attack, and his 
right followed the left and center in great disorder. 

Nearly all of Hood's artillery was left on the field. The 
pursuit was somewhat delayed by the great distance the 
dismounted cavalry had moved from the led horses and by 
the weather, the night being rainy and cold. Forrest had 
been recalled after the first day's fight, and he wisely hurried 
a brigade across country to cover Hood's rear. This brigade 
together with two brigades which, shortly before the line 
gave way, had been directed to cover the passes through the 
hills in rear. Hood was unable to effect any material reorgan- 
ization of his army until he had crossed the Harpeth and was 
compelled to abandon the defense of that river, leaving his 
hospital containing more than 2,000 wounded. Forrest re- 
joined Hood at Columbia and assisted by five brigades of 
infantry covered the retreat to the Tennessee, which Hood 
crossed at Bainbridge on a pontoon bridge which Granger's 
troops at Decatur had failed to destroy. The state of the roads 
delayed the Union pontoon trains, and Hood succeeded in cross- 
ing all his forces to the south bank of the Tennessee by night 
of the 27th. 



22 

Steedman's force had been moved to Murfreesboro and thence 
by rail to Decatur. At the end of the year, when Thomas 
considered the campaign closed, andlgave directions for going 
into winter quarters, Steedman was at Decatur, Wood at 
Lexington, Alabama, Smith at Pulaski, and Schofield at 
Columbia. 

This campaign "entirely ruined" Hood as Grant had 
directed Sherman to do. Its great success made Sherman's 
march to the sea a formidable military manoeuvre. It ended 
the rebel problem of war in the West and Southwest, leaving 
only the destruction of the rebel resources as a necessary 
war measure. Hood's army never again existed as such, 
but was furloughed, deserted, or was transferred to other 
fields. Its actual losses are indeterminate — Hood admitting 
to a less number than Thomas took as prisoners alone. It is 
known that 13,000 were taken prisoners or deserted to the 
Union forces. 

Despite the accusations of delay and threats of removal 
that had been cast at Thomas, his great success must be 
taken as a justification of the soundness of his policy. From 
a purely military standpoint it is difficult to see what great 
need of hurry there was. It must have been plain, on calm 
reflection, that Thomas' strength was increasing faster than 
Hood's and the probabilities of great victory increasing. Nor 
did any of Hood's movements justify the fear that he would 
retreat without wager of battle. 



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